

# Lecture notes on elliptic curve cryptography

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## 1 Discrete logarithm problem and encryption

In its full generality the discrete logarithm problem is the following: given a group  $G$  and elements  $a$  and  $b$ , find an integer  $k$  such that  $b^k = a$  (given that such  $k$  exists).

**Example 1.** For the group  $(\mathbb{R}_{>0}, \cdot)$  solving this problem for the fixed element  $b = e$ , is equivalent to taking the natural logarithm.

**Example 2.** Let  $p$  be a (large) prime number and let  $g \in \mathbb{F}_p^*$  be a generator of the multiplicative group, then the discrete log problem in  $\mathbb{F}_p^*$ , with  $b = g$ , is still asserted to be difficult.<sup>a</sup>

Alice and Bob can make use of this fact in order to encrypt their communications. Suppose Alice wants to send a message  $M \in \mathbb{F}_p^*$  to Bob, then they follow the following protocol, due to Elgamal:

1. First Bob takes a random  $x$  from  $\{1, \dots, p-1\}$  and computes his so-called public key  $Q := g^x$  and sends it to Alice.
2. Alice takes a random  $y$  from  $\{1, \dots, p-1\}$  and computes  $R := g^y$  and  $S := M \cdot Q^y$ , and send them to Bob.
3. Now Bob can compute  $S \cdot R^{-x} = (M \cdot Q^y) \cdot (g^y)^{-x} = M \cdot (g^x)^y \cdot g^{-xy} = M$ .

Even if anyone would get to know  $Q$ ,  $R$  and  $S$ , then still it is believed to be hard (if  $p$  is big enough) to find  $M$ .<sup>b</sup>

<sup>a</sup>This will not be the case anymore when there will be a quantum computer. Then Shor's algorithm will solve this problem quite easily.

<sup>b</sup>To be complete: this so-called computational Diffie-Hellman assumption is not equivalent to the discrete logarithm assumption, but the latter is a necessary condition for the former.

The encryption scheme described in Example 2 can be used using any group for which the computation of group operations is relatively easy and for which the discrete logarithm problem is relatively hard. An example of such a group is the group of rational points on an elliptic curve.

## 2 Elliptic curves

**Definition 3.** An elliptic curve over  $\mathbb{F}_q$  is a smooth projective curve of genus 1 together with an  $\mathbb{F}_q$ -rational point  $O$ .

**Remark 4.** More classically, elliptic curves are defined as smooth curves of the shape

$$Y^2Z + a_1XYZ + a_3YZ^2 = X^3 + a_2X^2Z + a_4XZ^2 + a_6Z^3$$

inside the projective plane  $\mathbb{P}_{\mathbb{F}_q}^2$ .<sup>a</sup> The chosen  $\mathbb{F}_q$ -rational point on this curve is  $O = (0 : 1 : 0)$ . We will call these *classical elliptic curves*.

<sup>a</sup>In fact, classically people write  $y^2 + a_1xy + a_3y = x^3 + a_2x^2 + a_4x + a_6$ , giving an equation for the affine chart  $z \neq 0$ .


### Exercise 5.

- (a) Prove that classical elliptic curves are of genus 1.
- (b\*) Prove that any elliptic curve is isomorphic to a classical elliptic curve.

One of the properties that makes elliptic curves interesting to study is the fact that its set of  $\mathbb{F}_q$ -rational points carries a group structure. In order to construct this, we need the following proposition.

**Proposition 6.** Let  $E$  be a classical elliptic curve over  $\mathbb{F}_q$  inside  $\mathbb{P}_{\mathbb{F}_q}^2$  and let  $\ell$  be a line in  $\mathbb{P}_{\mathbb{F}_q}^2$ . Then  $\ell$  intersects  $E$  three times, counting intersection points with multiplicity if necessary.


*Proof.* Although, we did not define multiplicity properly, it will become immediately clear from this proof. The line  $\ell$  is given by  $aX + bY + cZ = 0$  for some  $a, b, c \in \mathbb{F}_q$  not all equal to 0. Suppose that we want to find the intersection points of  $\ell$  and  $E$ . If  $a \neq 0$  (the cases  $b \neq 0$  and  $c \neq 0$  are similar), then we substitute all occurrences of  $X$  in the equation for  $E$  by  $-\frac{b}{a}Y - \frac{c}{a}Z$ . What we get is a homogeneous polynomial of degree 3 in the variables  $Y$  and  $Z$ , whose roots (counted with multiplicity) will give us the intersection points.  $\square$



*Addition of points on elliptic curves*

**Definition 7.** Let  $E$  be a classical elliptic curve over  $\mathbb{F}_q$  and let  $P, Q \in E(\mathbb{F}_q)$ . Let  $R$  be the unique third point on  $E$  on the line through  $P$  and  $Q$  (or the line tangent to  $E$  at  $P$  in case  $P = Q$ ). Then the point  $P \oplus Q$  is defined as the third point on the line through  $R$  and  $O$ .

One can check that this gives  $E(\mathbb{F}_q)$  the structure of an abelian group. It is fairly easy to see that  $O$  is the neutral element of this group, to find inverses and to prove commutativity. Associativity is a bit more tricky and a consequence of the following classical theorem in geometry.



*Illustration of associativity proof: one needs to show that the point in the middle, defined in both different ways gives the same point.*

**Theorem 8** (Cayley-Bacharach). *Suppose two cubics in the projective plane meet in nine points. Then any cubic going through eight of these points, also goes through the ninth.*

**Exercise 9.** To which three cubics in the illustration above should you apply Cayley-Bacharach to obtain the associativity of the group operation?

Already knowing the Riemann-Roch theorem, we can take a much easier route to show that the operation above gives an abelian group structure.

**Lemma 10.** *Let  $E$  be an elliptic curve. Then the map*

$$E(\mathbb{F}_q) \rightarrow \text{Pic}(E) : P \mapsto [P] - [O]$$

*is a bijection.*

*Proof.* Let us first prove surjectivity. Let  $D$  be a divisor of degree 0. Then  $D + O$  is of degree 1 and by Riemann-Roch  $\dim_{\mathbb{F}_q} \mathcal{L}(D + O) = 1$ . Hence, there is a function  $f$  for which  $\text{div}(f) + D + O$  is effective. On the other hand,  $\text{div}(f) + D + O$  is also of degree 1 and hence equals  $R$  for an  $R \in E(\mathbb{F}_q)$ . Therefore, inside  $\text{Pic}(E)$  we have  $[D] = [R] - [O]$ .

Now let us prove injectivity. Suppose that  $P \neq Q$  map to the same divisor class. Then  $[P] - [Q] = 0$ , or in other words there exists a function  $f : E \rightarrow \mathbb{P}^1$  having a simple zero at  $P$ , a simple pole at  $Q$  and no other zeros or poles. Due to the following exercise, this function is an isomorphism, which cannot exist as  $E$  is of genus 1 and  $\mathbb{P}^1$  is of genus 0.  $\square$

**Exercise 11.** Consider the function  $f : E \rightarrow \mathbb{P}^1$  having a simple zero at  $P$  and a simple pole at  $Q \neq P$ . Prove that  $f$  is an isomorphism. *(This should be an isomorphism of curves, but for the purpose of this course, it suffices if you prove that it is a bijection.)*

Now we can use Lemma 10 to provide  $E(\mathbb{F}_q)$  with the structure of a group.

**Exercise 12.** For classical elliptic curves, prove that Lemma 10 gives the same group structure as Definition 7.

### 3 Elliptic curve cryptography

In order to encrypt messages using elliptic curves we mimic the scheme in Example 2.

First of all Alice and Bob agree on an elliptic curve  $E$  over  $\mathbb{F}_q$  and a point  $P \in E(\mathbb{F}_q)$ . As the discrete logarithm problem is easier to solve for groups whose order is composite, they will choose their curve such that  $n := |E(\mathbb{F}_q)|$  is prime. Suppose Alice wants to send a message  $M \in E(\mathbb{F}_q)$  to Bob.

Bob takes a random  $x \in \{1, \dots, n\}$  and computes his so-called public key

$$Q := x \cdot P = \underbrace{P \oplus P \oplus \dots \oplus P}_{x \text{ times}}$$

and sends it to Alice. Alice, in her turn, takes a random  $y \in \{1, \dots, n\}$  and computes  $R := y \cdot P$  and sends it to Bob. Moreover, she computes  $S := M \oplus y \cdot Q$  and also sends this to Bob. Bob can now compute

$$S \ominus x \cdot R = M \oplus y \cdot Q \ominus xy \cdot P = M \oplus xy \cdot P \ominus xy \cdot P = M.$$

For any observer, who got hold of  $P, Q, R$  and  $S$ , it is still believed to be very difficult to find  $M$ , as the discrete logarithm problem for  $E(\mathbb{F}_q)$  is believed to be hard.

### 4 Elliptic curve factorisation (not examined)

Another nice application of elliptic curves is the factorisation of large integers. Suppose for simplicity that  $n = pq$  is the product of two primes, both greater than 3, and that we would like to factor  $n$ . The following factorisation algorithm is due to H. W. Lenstra Jr.

Classically, elliptic curves are given by equations of the shape  $y^2 = x^3 + ax + b$ , where it is understood that a point  $O$  at infinity is to be added to the curve. Given the coordinates  $(x_1, y_1)$  and  $(x_2, y_2)$  of two points, there are so-called addition formulas to compute the coordinates of their sum. These addition formulas can be found in many resources, but one of their properties is, that if you add a point to its inverse, and you get  $O$ , then somewhere in these formulas you would have to divide by 0.

Now, the algorithm goes as follows. Take an elliptic curve  $E$  over  $\mathbb{Z}/n\mathbb{Z}$  given by an equation  $y^2 = x^3 + ax + b$ , and a random point  $P \in E(\mathbb{Z}/n\mathbb{Z})$ .

Notice that  $\mathbb{Z}/n\mathbb{Z}$  is not a field, as  $n$  is not prime. However, we can still use the addition formulas. Points  $Q$  in  $E(\mathbb{Z}/n\mathbb{Z})$  can be considered as a pair  $(Q_1, Q_2)$  of points  $Q_1 \in E(\mathbb{F}_p)$  and  $Q_2 \in E(\mathbb{F}_q)$ .

Now we compute  $eP$  for  $e = m!$  for some reasonably chosen  $m$ . If we are lucky, it will happen that for one of the points  $Q$  that we encounter in the intermediate calculations  $Q_1 \in E(\mathbb{F}_p)$  becomes the point at infinity, and  $Q_2 \in E(\mathbb{F}_q)$  does not (or the other way around). In this case, in one of the addition formulas we have to divide by a number that is divisible by  $p$  and not by  $q$ . By calculating the greatest common divisor with  $n$ , we can then find  $p$ .

By trying multiple elliptic curves  $E$  and base points  $P$ , it is very likely that we will find a factor of  $n$ . The interested reader is encouraged to look up more details themselves.